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Abstract
In this paper we formulate and solve a mean-field game described
by a linear stochastic dynamics and a quadratic or exponential-quadratic
cost functional for each generic player. The optimal strategies for
the players are given explicitly using a simple and direct method
based on square completion and a Girsanov-type change of measure,
suggested in Duncan et al. in e.g. [3, 4] for the mean-field free
case. This approach does not use the well-known solution meth-
ods such as the Stochastic Maximum Principle and the Dynamic
Programming Principle with Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equa-
tion and Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation. In the risk-neutral
linear-quadratic mean-field game, we show that there is unique best re-
sponse strategy to the mean of the state and provide a simple sufficient
condition of existence and uniqueness of mean-field equilibrium. This
approach gives a basic insight into the solution by providing a sim-
ple explanation for the additional term in the robust or risk-sensitive
Riccati equation, compared to the risk-neutral Riccati equation. Suf-
ficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of mean-field equilibria
are obtained when the horizon length and risk-sensitivity index are
small enough. The method is then extended to the linear-quadratic
robust mean-field games under small disturbance, formulated as a min-
imax mean-field game.
∗B. Djehiche is with KTH Royal Institute of Technology, boualem@kth.se
†H. Tembine is with New York University, tembine@nyu.edu
1 Introduction
Mean-field games [2] with very large number of players have been widely
studied recently. Various solution methods such as the Stochastic Maximum
Principle (SMP) ([10]) and the Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP) with
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation and Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equa-
tion have been proposed [2, 10]. Most studies illustrated these solution meth-
ods in the linear-quadratic (LQ) game [8, 9]. In this paper, we propose a sim-
ple argument that gives the best-response strategy and the best-response cost
for the LQ-game without use of the well-known solution methods (SMP and
DPP). We apply a simple square completion and a Girsanov-type change of
measure (when it applies), successfully applied by Duncan et al. [3, 4, 5, 15, 7]
in the mean-field-free case. This method is well suited to LQ games and can
hardly be extended to other dynamics and performance functionals. Ap-
plying the solution methodology related to the DPP or the SMP requires
involved (stochastic) analysis (e.g. in the risk-sensitive case) and convexity
arguments to insure necessary and sufficient optimality criteria. We avoid
all this with this method. Although, for this simple case, we note that both
DPP and SMP give the same linear structure of the best-response strategies
as the actual square completion method.
In the LQ-mean-field game problems the state process can be modeled
by a set of linear stochastic differential equations of McKean-Vlasov type
and the preferences are formalized by quadratic or exponential of integral
of quadratic cost functions with mean-field terms. These game problems
are very popular in the literature and a detailed exposition of this theory
can be found in [10, 11]. The popularity of these game problems is due
to practical considerations in signal processing, pattern recognition, filtering
and prediction, economics and management science [1].
To some extent, most of the risk-neutral versions of these optimal controls
are analytically and numerically solvable [4, 15, 7]. On the other hand,
the linear quadratic risk-sensitive setting naturally appears if the decision
makers’ objective is to minimize the effect of a small perturbation and related
variance of the optimally controlled nonlinear process. By solving a linear
quadratic risk-sensitive game problem, and using the implied optimal control
actions, players can significantly reduce the variance (and the cost) incurred
by this perturbation. While the risk-sensitive LQ optimal control has been
widely investigated in the literature starting from Jacobson 1973 [12], the
mean-field version of the problem has been introduced only recently in [18,
22]. In that paper, the authors established a stochastic maximum principle
for risk-sensitive mean-field-type control where the key mean-field term is
the mean state. The linear-quadratic risk-sensitive mean-field game has been
first introduced in [19].
Contribution
Our contribution can be summarized as follows. In the risk-neutral linear-
quadratic mean-field game, we show that there is a unique admissible best-
response strategy to any mean-field process. The argument to derive the
best response is a simple square completion method and is not based on
the classical solution methods used in the literature. We derive a fixed-point
equation for the mean-field equilibrium, through the state process. The fixed-
point equation is shown to have a unique solution on the entire trajectory
when the length of the horizon is small enough. In the risk-sensitive linear-
quadratic mean-field game, we establish a risk-sensitive Riccati equation with
mean-field term involved in the coefficients. However the existence a positive
admissible solution requires a condition on the risk sensitivity index. There
is a unique admissible best response strategy when θσ2 < b
2
r
, where θ is the
risk sensitivity index, b is the control action coefficient drift, r is the weight
on the quadratic cost and σ is the diffusion coefficient. Further, we con-
sider robust mean-field games, formulated as a minmax games, and establish
a simple connection between the risk-sensitive best and the robust best re-
sponse. Interestingly, the technique does not require min-max type partial
differential equation (such as the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation). We also
derive a unique admissible best-response strategy under worst-case distur-
bance. Finally, a risk-sensitive and robust mean-field game are considered in
a similar way.
Structure
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
present linear-quadratic mean-field games with risk-neutral cost functional.
In Section 3 we focus on risk-sensitive mean-field games. Section 4 examines
robust mean-field games. In Section 5 we consider the robust risk-sensitive
mean-field games. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Notation and Preliminaries
Let T > 0 be a fixed time horizon and (Ω,F , lF, lP) be a given filtered
probability space on which a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion
B = {Bs}s≥0 is given, and the filtration lF = {Fs, 0 ≤ s ≤ T} is the natural
filtration of B augmented by lP−null sets of F .
We introduce the following notation.
• Let k ≥ 1. Lk(0, T ; lR) is the set of functions f : [0, T ]→ R such that∫ T
0
|f(t)|kdt <∞.
• LklF(0, T ; lR) is the set of lF-adapted lR-valued processes X(·) such that
E
[∫ T
0
|X(t)|kdt
]
<∞.
• For t ∈ [0, T ], |ψ|t := sup0≤s≤t |ψ(s)|.
An admissible control strategy u is an lF-adapted and square-integrable
process with values in a non-empty subset U of lR. We denote the set of all
admissible controls by U :
U = {u(·) ∈ L2lF(0, T ; lR); u(t) ∈ U a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], lP− a.s.}
Given u ∈ U , consider the following controlled linear SDE.{
dx(t) = [ax(t) + a¯m(t) + bu(t)]dt+ σdB(t),
x(0) = x0 ∈ lR,
(1)
where, a, a¯, b, σ are real numbers and m is a deterministic function such that
|m|T <∞. Then the following holds
Lemma 1. (1) There exists a constant CT > 0 depending on T, a, a¯, b, σ
and |m|T such that
E[|x|2T ] ≤ CT
(
1 + |x(0)|2 + E
[∫ T
0
|u(t)|2dt
])
(2)
(2) If f is a Borel function from [0, T ]× lR into lR and is of linear growth
i.e. there exists a constant C > 0 such that |f(t, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|), for
any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× lR, then the process defined, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , by
Et(x) := exp
(∫ t
0
f(s, x(s))dB(s)−
1
2
∫ t
0
|f(s, x(s))|2ds
)
, (3)
is an lF-martingale.
In particular,
E [ET (x)] = 1. (4)
Proof. The first assertion follows from the Gronwall and the Burkholder-
Davis-Gundy’s inequalities. The second assertion follows from Corollary
3.5.16 in [21].
2 Linear-quadratic mean-field game: risk-
neutral case
Consider a very large number of risk-neutral decision-makers. The best-
response of a player is the following risk-neutral linear-quadratic mean-field
problem where the mean-field term is through the mean of all the states of
all the players:

infu(·)∈U
1
2
E [q(T )x2(T ) + q¯(T )[x(T )−m(T )]2
+
∫ T
0
q(t)x2(t) + q¯(t)(x(t)−m(t))2 + r(t)u2(t)dt
]
,
subject to
dx(t) = [ax(t) + a¯m(t) + bu(t)]dt+ σdB(t),
x(0) ∈ R,
(5)
where, q(t) ≥ 0, q¯(t) ≥ 0, r(t) > 0, and a, a¯, b, σ are real numbers and where
m(t) is the mean state trajectory created by all players at an equilibrium (if
it exists).
Any u¯(·) ∈ U satisfying the infimum in (5) is called a risk-neutral best-
response strategy of a generic player to the mean-field term (m(t))t. The
corresponding state process, solution of (5), is denoted by x¯(·) := xu¯[m](·).
The risk-neutral mean-field equilibrium problem we are concerned with is
to characterize the triplet (x¯, u¯, m) solution of the problem (5) and the mean
state created by all the players coincide with m, i.e.,
m(t) = E[xu¯[m](t)],
which is a fixed-point equation.
Definition 1. A mean-field equilibrium problem is a collection (x¯, u¯, m) such
that u¯ minimizes (5) and E[x¯] = m.
Note that we define a mean-field equilibrium through the mean state and not
the entire distribution itself.
2.1 Determining the best-response of a player
Let
L(u) = 1
2
[q(T )x2(T ) + q¯(T )[x(T )−m(T )]2
+
∫ T
0
{q(t)x2 + q¯(t)(x(t)−m(t))2 + r(t)u2}dt].
(6)
Then, the risk-neutral cost functional in (5) is E[L(u)], the expected value
fo L.
Let f(t, x) = 1
2
β(t)x2 + α(t)x + γ(t), where, α, β and γ are deterministic
function of time, such that
f(T, x) =
1
2
[
q(T )x2 + q¯(T )[x−m(T )]2
]
,
i.e. β(T ) = q(T ) + q¯(T ), α(T ) = −q¯(T )m(T ), γ(T ) = q¯(T )
2
m2(T ).
By applying Itoˆ’s formula to f(t, x(t)), we have
f(T, x(T ))− f(0, x(0))
=
∫ T
0
[ft(t, x(t)) + (ax(t) + a¯m(t) + bu(t))fx(t, x(t)) +
σ2
2
fxx(t, x(t))]dt
+
∫ T
0
σfx(t, x(t))dB(t)
=
∫ T
0
{
β˙
2
(t) + aβ(t)}x2(t) + (α˙(t) + aα(t) + a¯β(t)m(t))x(t)dt
+
∫ T
0
(γ˙(t) + a¯α(t)m(t) +
σ2
2
β(t)) + bu(β(t)x(t) + α(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
σ(β(t)x(t) + α(t))dB(t). (7)
We evaluate L(u)− 1
2
β(0)x2(0)− α(0)x(0)− γ(0) :
L(u)−
1
2
β(0)x2(0)− α(0)x(0)− γ(0) (8)
= f(T, x(T ))− f(0, x(0))
+
1
2
∫ T
0
{q(t)x2(t) + q¯(t)(x(t)−m(t))2 + r(t)u2(t)}dt
=
∫ T
0
{
β˙
2
(t) + aβ(t)}x2(t)dt
+
∫ T
0
(α˙(t) + aα(t) + a¯β(t)m(t))x(t)dt
+
∫ T
0
(γ˙(t) + a¯α(t)m(t) +
σ2
2
β(t)) + bu(t)(β(t)x(t) + α(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
[
q(t) + q¯(t)
2
x2(t)− q¯(t)m(t)x(t) +
q¯(t)
2
m2(t) +
r(t)
2
u2(t)] dt
+
∫ T
0
σ(β(t)x(t) + α(t))dB(t).
Thus,
L(u)−
1
2
β(0)x2(0)− α(0)x(0)− γ(0) (9)
=
∫ T
0
{
β˙(t)
2
+ aβ(t) +
q(t) + q¯(t)
2
}x2(t)dt
+
∫ T
0
(α˙(t) + aα(t) + a¯β(t)m(t)− q¯(t)m(t))x(t)dt
+
∫ T
0
(γ˙(t) + a¯α(t)m(t) +
σ2
2
β(t) +
q¯(t)
2
m2(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
[bu(t)(β(t)x(t) + α(t)) +
r(t)
2
u2(t)] dt
+
∫ T
0
σ(β(t)x(t) + α(t))dB(t) (10)
We now use the following simple square completion relation:
bu(βx+ α) +
r
2
u2 (11)
=
r
2
(
u+
b
r
(βx+ α)
)2
−
b2
2r
(βx+ α)2
=
r
2
(
u+
b
r
(βx+ α)
)2
−
b2β2
2r
x2 −
b2αβ
r
x−
b2α2
2r
.
Hence,
L(u)−
1
2
β(0)x2(0)− α(0)x(0)− γ(0) (12)
=
∫ T
0
{
β˙(t)
2
+ aβ(t) +
q(t) + q¯(t)
2
−
b2β2(t)
2r(t)
}x2(t)
+
∫ T
0
(α˙(t) + aα(t) + a¯β(t)m(t)− ¯q(t)m(t)−
b2α(t)β(t)
r(t)
)x(t)dt
+
∫
(γ˙(t) + a¯α(t)m(t) +
σ2
2
β(t) +
q¯(t)
2
m2(t)−
b2α2(t)
2r(t)
)dt
+
∫ T
0
r(t)
2
[
u(t) +
b
r(t)
(β(t)x(t) + α(t))
]2
dt
+
∫ T
0
σ(β(t)x(t) + α(t))dB(t). (13)
Since the expected value of the last term (13) is zero and r > 0, we have
E[L(u)] ≥
1
2
β(0)x2(0) + α(0)x(0) + γ(0), u ∈ U , (14)
if and only if

β˙(t) + 2aβ(t)− b
2
r(t)
β2(t) + q(t) + q¯(t) = 0,
β(T ) = q(T ) + q¯(T ) ≥ 0,
α˙(t) + aα(t) + (a¯β(t)− q¯(t))m(t)− b
2
r(t)
α(t)β(t) = 0,
α(T ) = −q¯(T )m(T ),
γ˙(t) + a¯α(t)m(t) + σ
2
2
β(t) + q¯(t)
2
m2(t)− b
2
2r(t)
α2(t) = 0,
γ(T ) = q¯(T )
2
m2(T ).
(15)
with equality if and only if
u(t) = −
b
r(t)
(β(t)x(t) + α(t)).
Since b > 0, r > 0 by assumption, the risk-neutral Riccati equation in (15),
has a unique positive solution β. Incorporating it into the equation satisfied
by α one gets a solution α(m) by direct integration. Thus, the unique best-
response strategy is
u¯(t) = −
b
r(t)
(β(t)x¯(t) + α[m](t)), (16)
where, α, β are solutions of (15). Moreover, the associated performance is
E[L(u¯)] =
1
2
β(0)x2(0) + α(0)x(0) + γ(0). (17)
2.2 Risk-Neutral Mean-Field Equilibrium
We now look for an equilibrium of the risk-neutral linear-quadratic game,
which we call risk-neutral mean-field equilibrium. If (x¯, u¯, m) is a mean-field
equilibrium then m solves the following fixed-point equation:
m(t) = m0+
∫ t
0
[(a+a¯)m(s)−
b2
r(s)
(β(s)m(s)+α[m](s))] ds =: Φ[m](t), (18)
which can be rewritten as m = Φ[m]. The Banach fixed-point theorem (also
known as the contraction mapping theorem) is an important tool in the
theory of complete metric spaces. It guarantees the existence and uniqueness
of fixed points of certain self-maps of complete metric spaces, and provides
a constructive method to find those fixed points by Banach-Picard iterates.
From the inequality in Lemma 1, we deduce that the operator Φ maps
Lk(0, T ; lR) into itself, and Lk(0, T ; lR) is a complete metric space. Therefore,
a simple sufficient condition for having a unique fixed-point of Φ is given by a
strict contraction of Φ, which is ensured if its Lipschitz constant LΦ is strictly
less than one.
A standard Gronwall inequality yields
LΦ < T
[
g1 + g˜1(q¯T + ǫ1e
T |a−b2β/r|T )
]
.
where
g1 = |a+ a¯− b
2β/r|T , g˜1 = |b
2/r|T ǫ1 = |a¯β − q¯|T . (19)
Thus, we have proved the following
Proposition 1. Suppose that r > 0, s > 0, q + q¯ > 0 then there exists a
unique best response strategy u¯ = − b
r
(βx + α), where α and β solve the
Riccati equations (15).
In addition, if T
[
g1 + g˜1(q¯T + ǫ1e
T |a−b2β/r|T )
]
< 1 then there is a unique
risk-neutral mean-field equilibrium.
We now refine the equation satisfied by α by setting α = ηm.{
α˙(t) + aα(t) + (a¯β(t)− q¯(t))m(t)− b
2
r(t)
α(t)β(t) = 0,
α(T ) = −q¯(T )m(T ).
(20)
Then, {
η˙ + [2a+ a¯− 2 b
2
r
β]η − b
2
r
η2 + (a¯β − q¯) = 0,
η(T ) = −q¯(T ).
(21)
Closed-Form Expression of Mean-Field Equilibrium
Whenever α and β does not blow-up within [0, T ], the explicit mean-field
equilibrium is given by

m(t) = m(0)e
∫
t
0
(a+a¯− b
2
r
(β+η))dt
β˙(t) + 2aβ(t)− b
2
r(t)
β2(t) + q(t) + q¯(t) = 0,
β(T ) = q(T ) + q¯(T ),
η˙(t) + [2a+ a¯− 2 b
2
r(t)
β(t)]η(t)− b
2
r(t)
η2(t) + (a¯β(t)− q¯(t)) = 0,
η(T ) = −q¯(T )
u¯ = − b
r(t)
(β(t)x(t) + η(t)m(t))
(22)
3 Linear exponential-quadratic mean-field game:
risk-sensitive case
We now consider a very large number of risk-sensitive decision-makers. While
the risk-sensitive Linear Quadratic Gaussian optimal control have been widely
investigated in the literature starting from Jacobson 1973 [12], the mean-field
game version of the problem has been introduced only recently [19].
The best-response of a player is the following risk-sensitive linear-quadratic
mean-field problem where the mean-field term is through the mean of all the
states of all the players:

infu(·)∈U Ee
θL(u),
subject to
dx(t) = [ax(t) + a¯m(t) + bu(t)]dt+ σdB(t),
x(0) ∈ R.
(23)
Similarly as above, any u¯(·) ∈ U satisfying the infimum in (23) is called a risk-
sensitive best-response of a generic player to the mean-field term (m(t))t. The
corresponding state process, solution of (23), is denoted by x¯(·) := xu¯[m](·).
The risk-sensitive mean-field equilibrium problem we are concerned with
is to characterize the triplet (x¯, u¯, m) solution of the problem (23) and the
state created by all the players coincide with m, i.e.,
m(t) = E[xu¯[m](t)],
which is a fixed-point equation.
We complete with the term−1
2
∫ T
0
θ2σ2(β(t)x(t)+α(t))2dt+θ
∫ T
0
[1
2
θσ2](β(t)x(t)+
α(t))2dt in L(u) to obtain
θ[L(u)−
1
2
β(0)x2(0)− α(0)x(0)− γ(0)] (24)
= θ
∫ T
0
{
β˙
2
(t) + aβ(t) +
q(t) + q¯(t)
2
+ (−
b2
2r(t)
+
1
2
θσ2)β2(t)}x2(t)dt
+θ
∫ T
0
(α˙(t) + aα(t) + a¯β(t)m(t)− q¯(t)m(t) + (−
b2
r(t)
+ θσ2(t))α(t)β(t))x(t)dt
+θ
∫
(γ˙(t) + a¯α(t)m(t) +
σ2
2
β(t) +
q¯(t)
2
m2(t)−
b2α2(t)
2r(t)
+
1
2
θσ2α2(t))dt
+θ
∫ T
0
r
2
[
u(t) +
b
r(t)
(β(t)x(t) + α(t))
]2
dt
+
∫ T
0
θσ(β(t)x(t) + α(t))dB(t)−
1
2
∫ T
0
θ2σ2(β(t)x(t) + α(t))2dt. (25)
Taking the exponential and the expectation yields
Eeθ[L(u)−
1
2
β(0)x2(0)−α(0)x(0)−γ(0)] = E
[
ET (x)e
θ
∫
T
0
r(t)
2 [u(t)+
b
r(t)
(β(t)x(t)+α(t))]
2
dt
]
≥ E [ET (x)]
(26)
if and only if (β, α, γ) satisfies the following system of equations, where we
call the equation satisfied by β the risk-sensitive Riccati equation:

β˙(t) + 2aβ(t)− ( b
2
r(t)
− θσ2)β2(t) + q(t) + q¯(t) = 0
α˙(t) + aα(t) + (a¯β(t)− q¯(t))m(t) + (− b
2
r(t)
+ θσ2)α(t)β(t) = 0
γ˙(t) + a¯α(t)m(t) + σ
2
2
β(t) + q¯(t)
2
m2(t)− b
2α2(t)
2r(t)
+ θσ
2
2
α2(t) = 0,
γ(T ) = q¯(T )
2
m2(T ),
(27)
with equality if and only if
u¯(t) = −
b
r(t)
(β(t)x¯(t) + α(t)), (28)
where, x¯ solves the dynamics in (23) associated with u¯, and
Et(x) := exp
(∫ t
0
θσ(β(s)x(s) + α(s))dB(s)−
1
2
∫ t
0
θ2σ2(β(s)x(s) + α(s))2ds
)
.
Now, the risk-sensitive Riccati equation in β above has a unique positive
solution if b
2
r
− θσ2 > 0, i.e., θ < b
2
rσ2
, in which case, in view of Lemma 1, we
have
E[ET (x)] = 1, u ∈ U .
Hence
EeθL(u) ≥ eθ[
1
2
β(0)x2(0)+α(0)x(0)+γ(0)] , u ∈ U ,
with equality for u = u¯, which constitutes the unique best response to the
mean-field process.
Hence, the cost functional associated to the best response u¯ given by (28) is
EeθL(u¯) = eθ(
1
2
β(0)x2(0)+α(0)x(0)+γ(0)) . (29)
Note that the presence of the term θσ2 in the risk-sensitive Riccati equation
(27) comes from the completion of the exponential martingale. One gets the
risk-neutral Riccati equation as θ vanishes.
For T and θ sufficiently small enough, the risk-sensitive mean-field game is
completely solvable. Note that, however that for large θ, the solution β may
blow-up in finite time and the control − b
r
(βx+ α) becomes non-admissible.
Thus, we have proved the following
Proposition 2. Consider the linear-quadratic risk-sensitive mean-field game
associated with (23). Suppose that r > 0, s > 0, q + q¯ > 0 and θ < b
2
rσ2
then
there exists a unique best response strategy u¯ = − b
r
(βx+ α), where α and β
solves the risk-sensitive Riccati equation (27) .
In addition, if T
[
g2 + g˜2(q¯T + ǫ2e
T |a+(−b2/r+θσ2)β|T )
]
< 1 then there is
a unique robust risk-sensitive mean-field equilibrium, where g2 = |a + a¯ +
(−b2/r)β|T , g˜2 = | − b
2/r|T , ǫ2 = |a¯β − q¯|T , which are modification of g1, g˜1
and ǫ1 given by (19).
4 Robust mean-field game: the risk-neutral
case
Consider a very large number of risk-neutral players and a malicious/disturbance
term v. We refer to [20] for an interesting application of robust mean-field
games to crowd seeking problems in social networks. We assume that the
disturbance term v takes values a subset V of lR and define the set of distur-
bance strategies V in a similar fashion as U . Next, we formulate a risk-neutral
robust mean-field game as a minmax mean-field game as follows.
Let
L2(u, v) =
1
2
∫ T
0
{q(t)x2(t) + q¯(t)(x(t)−m(t))2 + r(t)u2(t)− s(t)v2(t)}dt
+1
2
[q(T )x2(T ) + q¯(T )[x(T )−m(T )]2]
(30)
be the cost functional of a generic player with strategy u under disturbance
v when the mean-field process is m.
The best-response of a generic player is the following risk-neutral linear-
quadratic robust mean-field problem under worst case disturbance is

infu(·)∈U supv(·)∈V E [L2(u, v)] ,
subject to
dx(t) = [ax+ a¯m(t) + bu(t) + cv(t)]dt+ σdB(t),
x(0) ∈ R,
(31)
where, q(t) ≥ 0, q¯(t) ≥ 0, r(t) > 0, and a, a¯, b, σ are real numbers and where
m(t) is the mean state trajectory created by all players at robust equilibrium
(if it exists).
Any (u¯(·), v¯(·)) ∈ U × V satisfying the min-max in (31) is called a risk-
neutral robust best-response of a generic player to the mean-field process
(m(t))t under worst case disturbance v¯. The corresponding state process,
solution of (31), is denoted by x¯(·) := xu¯,v¯[m](·).
The robust mean-field equilibrium problem we are concerned with is to
characterize the collection (x¯, u¯, v¯, m) solution of the problem (31) and the
mean state created by all the players coincide with m, i.e.,
m(t) = E[xu¯,v¯[m](t)],
which is a fixed-point equation.
Definition 2. A robust mean-field equilibrium problem is a collection (x¯, u¯, v¯, m)
such that u¯ minimizes (31) under worst disturbance v¯ and E[x¯] = m.
At a robust mean-field equilibrium, the best-response to the mean-field
under worst case disturbance, should reproduce the mean-field itself.
4.1 Determining the robust best-response of a player
The terminal cost is similar as above but now Itoˆ’s formula to the function f is
different because of the disturbance. Let f(t, x) = 1
2
β(t)x2(t)+α(t)x(t)+γ(t).
By applying Itoˆ’s formula, we have
f(T, x(T ))− f(0, x(0))
=
∫ T
0
[ft(t, x(t)) + (ax(t) + a¯m(t) + bu(t) + cv(t))fx(t, x(t)) +
σ2
2
fxx(t, x(t))]dt
+
∫ T
0
σfx(t, x(t))dB(t)
=
∫ T
0
{
β˙(t)
2
+ aβ(t)}x2(t) + (α˙(t) + aα(t) + a¯β(t)m(t))x(t)dt
+
∫ T
0
(γ˙(t) + a¯α(t)m(t) +
σ2
2
β(t)) + (bu(t) + cv(t))(β(t)x(t) + α(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
σ(β(t)x(t) + α(t))dB(t). (32)
We now compute the difference L2(u, v)−
1
2
β(0)x2(0)− α(0)x(0)− γ(0).
We have
L2(u, v)−
1
2
β(0)x2(0)− α(0)x(0)− γ(0) =
∫ T
0
{ β˙(t)
2
+ aβ(t) + q(t)+q¯(t)
2
}x2(t) dt
+
∫ T
0
(α˙(t) + aα(t) + a¯β(t)m(t)− q¯(t)m(t))x(t)dt
+
∫ T
0
(γ˙(t) + a¯α(t)m(t) + σ
2
2
β(t) + q¯(t)
2
m2(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
[(bu(t) + cv(t))(β(t)x(t) + α(t)) + r(t)
2
u2(t)− s(t)
2
v2(t)] dt
+
∫ T
0
σ(β(t)x(t) + α(t))dB(t).
(33)
We now use the following relations:
bu(βx+ α) +
r
2
u2 =
r
2
(
u+
b
r
(βx+ α)
)2
−
b2β2
2r
x2 −
b2αβ
r
x−
b2α2
2r
and
cv(βx+ α)−
s
2
v2 = −
s
2
(
v −
c
s
(βx+ α)
)2
+
c2β2
2s
x2 −
c2αβ
r
x−
c2α2
2s
to obtain
L2(u, v)−
1
2
β(0)x2(0)− α(0)x(0)− γ(0)
=
∫ T
0
{
β˙(t)
2
+ aβ(t) +
q(t) + q¯(t)
2
+ (−
b2
2r(t)
+
c2
2s(t)
)β2(t)}x2(t)
+
∫ T
0
(α˙(t) + aα(t) + a¯β(t)m(t)− q¯(t)m(t) + (−
b2
r(t)
+
c2
s(t)
)α(t)β(t))x(t)dt
+
∫
(γ˙(t) + a¯α(t)m(t) +
σ2
2
β(t) +
q¯(t)
2
m2(t) + (−
b2
2r(t)
+
c2
2s(t)
)α2(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
r(t)
2
[
u(t) +
b
r(t)
(β(t)x(t) + α(t))
]2
−
s(t)
2
[
v(t)−
c
s(t)
(β(t)x(t) + α(t))
]2
dt
+
∫ T
0
σ(β(t)x(t) + α(t))dB(t). (34)
Therefore,
E[L2(u, v)] ≥
1
2
β(0)x2(0) + α(0)x(0) + γ(0), (u, v) ∈ U × V, (35)
if and only if (α, β, γ) solves the following system of equations where we call
the equation β solves, ’robust’ Riccati equation:

β˙(t) + 2aβ(t) + (− b
2
r(t)
+ c
2
s(t)
)β2(t) + q(t) + q¯(t) = 0,
β(T ) = q(T ) + q¯(T ) ≥ 0,
α˙(t) + aα(t) + (a¯β(t)− q¯(t))m(t) + (− b
2
r(t)
+ c
2
s(t)
)α(t)β(t) = 0,
α(T ) = −q¯(T )m(T ),
γ˙(t) + a¯α(t)m(t) + σ
2
2
β(t) + q¯(t)
2
m2(t) + (− b
2
2r(t)
+ c
2
2s(t)
)α2(t)
γ(T ) = q¯(T )
2
m2(T ),
(36)
with equality if and only if
u¯(t) = −
b
r(t)
(β(t)x(t) + α(t)), v¯(t) =
c
s(t)
(β(t)x(t) + α(t)). (37)
Since b > 0, r > 0, s > 0 by assumption, the robust Riccati equation
(36) in β has a unique positive solution if b
2
r
− c
2
s
> 0. Injecting β into the
equation satisfied by α we get a solution α(m) by direct integration. Thus,
there exists a unique best-response strategy whenever b
2
r
> c
2
s
> 0.
Remark 1. Setting c2/s = θσ2 in the robust Riccati equation (36), we obtain
the risk-sensitive Riccati equation (27).
4.2 Risk-Neutral Robust Mean-Field Equilibrium
If (x¯, u¯, v¯, m) is a robust mean-field equilibrium then m solves the following
fixed-point equation:
m = Φ[m], (38)
where,
Φ[m](t) := m0 +
∫ t
0
(a+ a¯)m(t′) + (−
b2
r(t′)
+
c2
s(t′)
)(β(t′)m(t′) + α[m](t′))dt′.
Since the term (− b
2
r
+ c
2
s
) is changed compared to the previous analysis and
LΦ < T
[
g3T + g˜3T (q¯T + ǫ3e
T |a+(−b2/r+c2/s)β|T )
]
,
where, g3 = |a+ a¯+(−b
2/r+c2/s)β|T , g˜3 = |(−b
2/r+c2/s)|T , ǫ3 = |a¯β− q¯|T .
Thus, we have proved the following
Proposition 3. Consider the robust linear-quadratic game associated with
(31). Suppose that r > 0, s > 0, and b
2
r
> c
2
s
> 0 then there exists a unique
best response strategy u¯ = − b
r
(βx + α), and the worst case disturbance is
v¯ = c
s
(βx+ α). where α and β solves the robust Riccati equation (36).
In addition, if T
[
g3T + g˜3T (q¯T + ǫ3e
T |a+(−b2/r+c2/s)β|T )
]
< 1, then there is a
unique risk-neutral robust mean-field equilibrium.
5 Linear exponential-quadratic robust mean-
field game
The risk-sensitive robust best-response of a player is a solution to the follow-
ing minmax problem:

infu(·)∈U supv(·)∈V Ee
θL2(u,v),
subject to
dx(t) = [ax(t) + a¯m(t) + bu(t) + cv(t)]dt+ σdB(t),
x(0) ∈ R.
(39)
Similarly as above, any (u¯(·), v¯(·)) ∈ U×V satisfying the min-max in (39)
is called a risk-sensitive robust best-response of a generic player to the mean-
field process (m(t))t under worst case disturbance v. The corresponding state
process, solution of (39), is denoted by x¯(·) := xu¯,v¯[m](·).
The risk-sensitive robust mean-field equilibrium problem we are con-
cerned with is to characterize the pair (x¯, u¯, v¯) solution of the problem (39)
and the state created by all the players coincide with m, i.e.,
m(t) = E[xu¯,v¯[m](t)],
which is a fixed-point equation. Completing with the term
−
1
2
∫ T
0
θ2σ2(β(t)x(t) + α(t))2dt+
1
2
θ
∫ T
0
θσ2(β(t)x(t) + α(t))2dt
in L2(u, v) we obtain
θ[L2(u, v)−
1
2
β(0)x2(0)− α(0)x(0)− γ(0)] (40)
= θ
∫ T
0
{
β˙(t)
2
+ aβ(t) +
q(t) + q¯(t)
2
+ (−
b2
2r(t)
+
c2
2s(t)
+
θ
2
σ2)β2(t)}x2(t)dt
+ θ
∫
(α˙(t) + aα(t) + a¯β(t)m(t)− q¯(t)m(t) + (−
b2
r(t)
+
c2
s(t)
+ θσ2)α(t)β(t))x(t)dt
+ θ
∫
(γ˙(t) + a¯α(t)m(t) +
σ2
2
β(t) +
q¯(t)
2
m2(t) + (−
b2
2r(t)
+
c2
2s(t)
+
θ
2
σ2)α2(t))dt
+ θ
∫ T
0
r(t)
2
[
u+
b
r(t)
(β(t)x(t) + α(t))
]2
−
s(t)
2
[
v(t)−
c
s(t)
(β(t)x(t) + α(t))
]2
dt
+
∫ T
0
θσ(β(t)x(t) + α(t))dB(t)−
1
2
∫ T
0
θ2σ2(β(t)x(t) + α(t))2dt. (41)
Taking exponential and the expectation yields
Eeθ[L2(u,v)] ≥ E [ET (x)] exp θ
[
1
2
β(0)x2(0) + α(0)x(0) + γ(0)
]
, (u, v) ∈ U × V,
where,
ET (x) := exp
(∫ T
0
θσ(β(t)x(t) + α(t))dB(t)−
1
2
∫ T
0
θ2σ2(β(t)x(t) + α(t))2dt
)
,
if and only if

β˙(t) + 2aβ(t) + (− b
2
r(t)
+ c
2
s(t)
+ θσ2)β2(t) + q(t) + q¯(t) = 0,
β(T ) = q(T ) + q¯(T ) ≥ 0,
α˙(t) + aα(t) + (a¯β(t)− q¯(t))m(t)
+(− b
2
r(t)
+ c
2
s(t)
+ θσ2)α(t)β(t) = 0,
α(T ) = −q¯(T )m(T ),
γ˙(t) + a¯α(t)m(t) + σ
2
2
β(t) + q¯(t)
2
m2(t) + (− b
2
2r(t)
+ c
2
2s(t)
+ θ
2
σ2)α2(t),
γ(T ) = q¯(T )
2
m2(T ),
(42)
with equality if and only if
u¯(t) = −
b
r(t)
(β(t)x(t) + α(t)), v¯(t) =
c
s(t)
(β(t)x(t) + α(t)). (43)
The risk-sensitive robust Riccati equation in β above has a unique positive
solution β(t) ≥ 0 if b
2
r
− c
2
s
−θσ2 > 0, which is satisfied if θ and c are relatively
small enough. In this case, in view of Lemma 1, E[ET (x)] = 1, which yields
Eeθ[L2(u,v)] ≥ eθ[
1
2
β(0)x2(0)+α(0)x(0)+γ(0)] , (u, v) ∈ U × V,
with equality if (u, v) = (u¯, v¯), which is a unique best response strategy to
the mean-field for b
2
r
> c
2
s
+ θσ2 > 0.
For T and θ, c sufficiently small enough, the risk-sensitive mean-field game is
completely solvable. Note however that for large θ, or c, the solution β may
blow-up in finite time and the control − b
r
(βx+ α) becomes non-admissible.
Thus, we have proved the following
Proposition 4. Suppose that r > 0, s > 0, q > 0, q¯ ≥ 0 and b
2
r
> c
2
s
+θσ2 > 0
then there exists a unique best response strategy u¯ = − b
r
(βx+α) and the worst
case disturbance is v¯ = c
s
(βx + α). where α and β solves the risk-sensitive
Riccati equations (42).
In addition, if T
[
g4 + g˜4(q¯ + ǫ4e
T |a+(−b2/r+c2/s+θσ2)β|T )
]
< 1 then there is a
unique robust risk-sensitive mean-field equilibrium, where, g4 = |a + a¯ +
(−b2/r + c2/s)β|T , g˜4 = |(−b
2/r + c2/s)|T , ǫ4 = |a¯β − q¯|T .
Remark 2. If the mean-field term is a function of the equilibrium control
action ξ(E[u¯]) instead of the mean state m¯, the same methodology applies,
except that the fixed-point equation is now different
E[u¯] = −
b¯
r
[βm¯+ α[ξ(E[u¯])]] .
This type of mean-field structures is observed in smart grids where the mean-
field term which modulates the price of electricity is a function of aggregate
demand and supply. The demand is generated by the users (residential con-
sumers, commercial, industrial, transportation etc). It is also relevant in
wireless networking where the mean-field term is the interference E[u¯.|x¯|2]
created by other users and u¯ ≥ 0 is the transmission power of the user. See
[13] for more details.
6 Concluding remarks
The method described in this paper provides an alternative to both the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation and the robust stochastic maxi-
mum principle for the particular case of LQ-games. The method exhibits
the best-response strategy of the player and the best-response cost directly
in the problem solution. The mean-field equilibrium is then formulated as
a fixed-point of the best-response. Sufficient conditions for existence and
uniqueness of mean-field equilibria are provided. The approach can be ex-
tended to more general LQ-games in several ways: (i) matrix form, (ii) games
with anomalous diffusions, (iii) partially observable games, (iv) robust coop-
erative mean-field-type games. We leave these questions for future work.
We note that this method can hardly be extended to games with arbitrary
nonlinear dynamics and cost performance.
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